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ABSTRACT: It has become more common recently for epistemologists to advocate the 
pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, the claim that the appropriateness of 
knowledge ascriptions is dependent on the relevant practical circumstances. Advocacy of 
practicalism in epistemology has come at the expense of contextualism, the view that 
knowledge ascriptions are independent of pragmatic factors and depend alternatively on 
distinctively epistemological, semantic factors with the result that knowledge ascriptions 
express different knowledge properties on different occasions of use. Overall, my goal 
here is to defend a particular version of contextualism drawn from work by Peter 
Ludlow, called ‘standards contextualism.’ My strategy will be to elaborate on this form of 
contextualism by defending it from various objections raised by the practicalists Jason 
Stanley, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. In showing how standards contextualism 
can effectively repel these criticisms I hope to establish that standards contextualism is a 
viable alternative to practicalism. 
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1. Introduction  
According to the proponents of the pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, 
whether one can be said to know a claim depends on the practical circumstances 
in which one finds oneself. For example, according to Jason Stanley’s ‘Interest-
Relative Invariantism,’ “whether or not someone knows that p may be determined 
in part by practical facts about the subject’s environment.”1 Jeremy Fantl and 
Matthew McGrath defend a similar view. They defend a pragmatist principle 
called ‘Action’ which states: “if you know that p you are proper to act on p when 
the question of whether p is relevant to the question of what to do.”2  Stephen 
Grimm calls the view Stanley, Fantl and McGrath are defending ‘practicalism,’ 
which Grimm contrasts, “borrowing Stanley’s label and basic idea, and in keeping 
with similar thoughts by Fantl and McGrath,” with the doctrine of 
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‘intellectualism,’ that “whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends 
exclusively on truth-related factors.”3  
The defense of practicalism, Grimm notes, usually focuses on the celebrated 
‘bank cases.’4 In general terms the bank cases involve an agent who has seemingly 
good evidence for a true claim, but who intuitively speaking knows this claim, or 
not, depending on how much is at stake for her. That is, given the same amount of 
evidence, it can happen that the agent knows this claim if very little is at stake, 
but not know the claim if a lot is at stake. For Stanley, Fantl and McGrath, and 
Grimm, the best way to explain this phenomenon is to reject intellectualism (or 
more precisely, for Grimm, ‘threshold’ intellectualism) and to allow into the 
normative evaluation of knowledge claims practical considerations.  
But, as Stanley points out, the celebrated bank cases have also been used to 
justify contextualism, the “distinctively epistemological”5 semantic thesis that 
knowledge predicates (i.e., ‘knows that …’) “denote different knowledge 
properties on different occasions of use.”6 What it means for context-sensitivity to 
be distinctively epistemological is subject to interpretation. “A sentence is context-
sensitive,” Stanley asserts, “if and only if it expresses different propositions relative 
to different contexts of use.”7 So, with distinctively epistemological context-
sensitivity, we find that epistemological factors lead to sentences expressing 
different propositions. But how does this come about? Stanley describes various 
ways this can occur, but for the most part settles on one version (deriving he notes 
from work by Peter Ludlow8). On this version,  
predicates that are instances of the schema ‘knows that p’ are context-sensitive 
since they are really of the form ‘knows that p relative to standards s’ where s 
receives a value from context.9 
I will call this version of contextualism ‘standards contextualism.’  
An important feature of contextualism, generally speaking, is that it is a 
form of intellectualism: with contextualism, whether one knows a claim, or not, is 
determined independently of pragmatic factors. Thus, practicalists like Stanley, 
                                                                
3 Stephen Grimm, “On Intellectualism in Epistemology,” Mind 120 (2011): 706. 
4 Grimm, “On Intellectualism in Epistemology,” 707. 
5 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 16. 
6 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 3. 
7 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 16. 
8 Peter Ludlow, “Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology,” in 
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2005). 
9 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 17. 
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Fantl and McGrath regard contextualism as a foil to their pragmatist conceptions 
of knowledge, and accordingly each provides arguments against contextualism. 
My plan in this paper, in elaboration of standards contextualism, is in section 2 to 
defend it from objections raised by Stanley, and in section 3 to defend it from 
objections raised by Fantl and McGrath. I then examine and respond to two 
further objections to standards contextualism in the final section. Overall, I hope 
to show that standards contextualism is a viable alternative to practicalism. 
2. Stanley Versus Contextualism  
Stanley provides a critique of contextualism from three vantage-points which we 
examine in turn. He considers, first, the bank cases and argues that contextualism 
fails to get the right answer with a certain version of these cases. Second, he 
introduces various ‘linguistic’ considerations and argues that, with contextualism, 
we wrongly conclude that knowledge ascriptions are gradable and that certain 
anomalous speech-act reports and anaphora are acceptable. Lastly, he takes aim at 
Ludlow’s unique brand of standards contextualism which he believes wrongly 
assigns a position for standards in all kinds of predications, not just in epistemic 
ones (i.e., knowledge ascriptions). We examine and respond to each of these 
criticisms. 
2.1 The Ignorant High Stakes Bank Case  
In Knowledge and Practical Interests Stanley examines five versions of the bank 
cases. In all these versions, the situation concerns an agent who is deliberating 
about whether to stand in line at a bank on a Friday to deposit a cheque or wait to 
deposit the cheque the next day. The question is whether she can be said to know 
the proposition, “the bank will be open tomorrow (Saturday).” The common view 
is that whether the agent knows the proposition depends on what’s at stake for the 
agent should her belief be mistaken. In one case, called ‘Low Stakes,’ there is little 
at risk for the agent since she has no impending bills due, and as such the 
evidential facts are sufficient for her to be said to know that the bank will be open 
on Saturday. By comparison, in the ‘High Stakes’ case, there is much at risk for the 
agent if she is mistaken (say, she has a bill coming due and the money needs to be 
in her account by Monday morning), and so with the same evidential facts she is 
said not to possess knowledge. According to Stanley, contextualism effectively 
handles these sorts of cases.10 But the situation is different for the case called 
‘Ignorant High Stakes.’ In this case someone thinks she is in a low stakes situation 
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but is actually in a high stakes situation, and so wrongly ascribes to herself 
knowledge. It is Stanley’s opinion that contextualism gives the wrong result in this 
sort of case because it incorporates the following claim: 
what determines the semantic value of instances of ‘knows that p’, relative to a 
context of use, is some collection of facts about the intentions and beliefs of the 
conversational participants in that context of use.11 
Accordingly, because in Ignorant High Stakes the agent (wrongly) believes 
that the stakes are low, the agent expresses a knowledge claim using epistemic 
standards that are themselves low. Thus, if the semantic value of this knowledge 
claim is set by these low standards (presumably as per standards contextualism) 
the agent can be said to possess knowledge.  
Motivated by the intuition that the agent lacks knowledge in Ignorant High 
Stakes, Stanley proposes a theory of knowledge in which the meaning of ‘knows 
that p’ does not vary with the context (‘invariantism’) and that whether an agent 
knows that p varies with whether p is a serious practical question for the agent 
(knowledge is ‘interest-relative’).  A “serious practical question,” for Stanley, is a 
“proposition that one must take into account in decision making,” where one’s 
obligation to take a proposition into account varies with how the truth of this 
proposition affects the warranted expected utility of the actions at one’s disposal.12 
As he further explains, one makes use of warranted expected utilities, and not 
alternatively ‘subjective credences,’ “because the agent might not be aware of 
what is in her own best interest.”13 That is, the warranted expected utility of an 
action is an objective quantity, but may not even be objective enough for Stanley. 
He comments:  
warranted expected utility is probably not sufficiently impersonal of a notion to 
do the required work. There may be facts relevant to the utility calculation that 
the agent is not epistemically responsible for knowing. So a more impersonal 
notion of utility may be required to capture the notion of a serious practical 
question.14 
The upshot is that an agent may be unaware that a proposition is a serious 
practical question for her, and so is mistaken in thinking she knows a claim. This 
is the sort of situation Stanley asserts we have in Ignorant High Stakes. 
A standards contextualist can respond to this problem in the following way. 
She can suggest that the agent is in a position to know the relevant claim in 
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Ignorant High Stakes, given her low (but not unreasonable) standards. 
Accordingly, if she were to bring about a belief in the claim, and assuming the 
claim is true, she could be said to know the claim. However, given the practical 
situation, the standards contextualist can further suggest that, practically speaking 
(though not necessarily epistemically speaking), the agent should be using higher 
standards if there is a severe cost should the claim be false. Moreover, with the 
adoption of these higher standards, it may be that the agent isn’t in a position to 
know the claim, after all. The standards contextualist may then recommend that 
the agent not bring the belief about, given the costs in being wrong, with the 
result that she doesn’t know the claim (even) in the low stakes situation since she 
doesn’t believe the claim.  
This is in fact the sort of approach to Ignorant High Stakes that I suggest we 
should take, and which I develop more fully later on. It is an approach that asks us 
to distinguish between the decision that, under certain evidential circumstances, 
we should believe a proposition (though not necessarily bring the belief about), 
and the decision that, where further practical considerations are taken into 
account, we should go further and actually bring about a belief in this proposition. 
In order to motivate this approach, let us look at some potential concerns with 
Stanley’s practicalist approach to Ignorant High Stakes. 
To begin with, what makes a proposition a serious practical question for 
Stanley is an objective matter, one that is determined independently of what an 
agent is even ‘epistemically responsible for knowing.’ But it isn’t, nor could it be, 
exclusively an objective matter, a point Stanley seems to acknowledge. Consider 
the proposition that you have an odd number of hairs. Stanley says, 
given that I do not care about the number of hairs you have, whether or not you 
have an odd number of hairs will not make a difference to the warranted 
expected utilities of retaining or discarding my belief. So, the proposition that 
you have an odd number of hairs is not a serious practical question for me.15 
Going back to Ignorant High Stakes, then, it might well be the case that the 
agent doesn’t care about the practical matter at hand – specifically, as the case is 
described, about whether a certain impending bill is coming due.16 As such, 
because the agent doesn’t care, she will possess knowledge after all for Stanley 
since it will become a low stakes situation for her. Of course, the scope of things 
people care about is changeable, and the agent may change her mind periodically 
about whether pending bills are a concern. It follows that whether the agent 
knows, or not, fluctuates with whether she cares about impending bills, and these 
                                                                
15 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 96. 
16 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 5. 
Robert Hudson 
40 
two matters seem totally unrelated to one another. It may even seem ‘mad’, as 
Fantl and McGrath – admitted practicalists – confess: “what is mad is the idea that 
whether you are in a position to know could be affected by stakes. But that is 
precisely what the pragmatist approach requires.”17 If one wants to gain 
knowledge, it seems one need only strive to not care about the truth of the claim 
one is considering. 
In order to restore some order as regards what one knows, to make what 
one knows less dependent on one’s changeable set of values, one may decide to 
seek some normative standards that regulate a prospective knower’s values. For 
instance, in Ignorant High Stakes, it may be that the agent is foolish in not caring 
about impending bills: she should care about them given how they may impact 
her life. Comparatively, the number of hairs someone has is obviously, and 
objectively irrelevant to one’s practical concerns (assuming a normal 
circumstance), and it may be that this is Stanley’s point in introducing this case. 
But the issue of what values one should have is not a straightforward, meta-ethical 
matter. There is plenty of debate about what things deserve to be valued, and this 
is certainly a matter that epistemologists should not feel the obligation to express 
an opinion about. The situation is further complicated by the fact that people 
often have values that run in different directions. In Ignorant High Stakes, the 
agent may care about impending bills, and so lack knowledge from that 
perspective, while also greatly value the appearance of being someone who knows 
things, and so from that perspective possesses knowledge. What then should a 
practicalist say about a situation where a knowledge ascription has both positive 
and negative practical implications? One can imagine many similar cases where an 
agent’s values pull the agent in opposite directions, where there is ambiguity (from 
a practicalist perspective) on the question of whether an agent knows. Indeed, the 
ambiguity here becomes more complicated once one considers that an agent may 
have even more values that pull in yet other directions. One lesson here is that we 
should be cautious about using cases that are over-simplified. In the original bank 
cases, the matter turns solely on whether the agent has impending bills due or not, 
and if so whether she should put off or not going to the bank on Saturday. But 
practical decisions can get very complicated – a person’s value set can contain 
many diverse elements. The important point is that these valuational 
complications can have crucial epistemic implications for a practicalist like 
Stanley, no matter what they are and no matter how trivial they seem, and that 
this seems to take us beyond what should be the proper ambit of epistemology. 
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To further illustrate how unnecessarily complicated matters can become, 
consider once more High Stakes, the case in which there is much at stake if the 
agent is mistaken. The case seems straightforward for the practicalist: there’s lots 
at stake so the agent has to be sure her belief is correct, and so despite the fact that 
with the very same evidence she can be said to know in the low stakes case, she 
may not know when the stakes are high. But the same thing may happen in this 
case as we find in Ignorant High Stakes – the agent may be mistaken about the 
stakes and so we have a parallel Ignorant Low Stakes case in which the stakes are 
low, though the agent thinks they are high. What this means is that in any 
particular situation, since an agent may be mistaken about the stakes, she might be 
mistaken as well about whether she knows. So with practicalism we have the 
somewhat puzzling predicament that, despite the constancy of the evidence, it 
remains unclear whether an agent knows a claim if there is uncertainty about the 
practical situation. An agent knows or doesn’t know, unbeknownst to her, 
dependent on what the hidden stakes are, without any changes in the evidence, in 
the truth of the claim, or in the agent’s state of belief. To paraphrase Stanley, the 
practicalist can handle this situation “only at the cost of advancing a rather 
dramatic claim about the potential [epistemic] effects of non-psychological facts 
about extralinguistic [stakes].”18 
So our general conclusion about the Ignorant High Stakes case is this: 
whereas Stanley maintains that Ignorant High Stakes is a case the contextualist has 
trouble with, we have argued that the case poses just as much, if not more trouble 
for Interest-Relative Invariantism. So having then defused this potential, practical 
problem for (standards) contextualism, let us now look at the linguistic critiques 
Stanley offers against contextualism. 
2.2 Stanley’s First Linguistic Critique: Knowledge Ascriptions are Not Gradable  
Stanley notes that for contextualists such as Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose, 
“knowledge ascriptions come in varying degrees of strength,” that is, “they are 
intuitively gradable.”19 This is what we would expect from standards 
contextualism where the standards that modify knowledge ascriptions could be 
high (more demanding) or low (less demanding). As such, if (standards) 
contextualism were true, we’d expect linguistic expressions of knowledge to pass 
two tests: (1) they should allow for modifiers, and (2) be amenable to comparative 
constructions. Stanley asserts that since knowledge ascriptions fail both tests, they 
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are not gradable after all, and so (standards) contextualism is false.20 In looking at 
these tests in more detail I plan to show that, properly understood, knowledge 
ascriptions pass these tests. 
Consider first the use of modifiers. Stanley uses as paradigm examples of 
acceptable modifications of gradable expressions “Michigan is flat, but not really 
flat”21 and “‘I don’t like Bill very much.”22 Can the word ‘know’ be used in 
analogous expressions? Stanley thinks not. Consider the sentence, “John knows 
that the bank is open, but doesn’t really know that the bank is open,” which 
Stanley finds extremely odd. Similarly, consider “I don’t know very much that 
Bush is president,” which also sounds peculiar. A possible diagnosis for why these 
expressions sound odd is that knowing mundane facts, such as whether the bank is 
open or whether Bush is president, is a ‘yes/no’ sort of issue – either you know it 
or you don’t –, and in fact all of Stanley’s examples are of this kind. But there are 
areas of inquiry where states of knowledge are more nuanced, such as in the 
sciences. For example, a student might say, “I know that atoms have orbitals (say, 
well enough to pass the test), but I don’t really know that atoms have orbitals.” 
What the student is saying is that she is aware of the basic fact of orbitals, but 
cannot provide the fine details of orbital theory, which would require a deeper 
understanding of atomic physics. That is, on a lower standard (the standard used 
in assessing students), she knows that atoms have orbitals, but on a higher 
standard (the standard used by professional physicists), she doesn’t (really) know 
this claim. Here is a less technical example: someone with a stuffy nose and a sore 
throat says, “I know I have a cold, but I don’t really know I have a cold.” For the 
purposes of day-to-day discourse, telling people that one has a cold is sufficient 
(say, to distinguish one’s ailment from allergies), but not adequate if one were to 
seek medical precision. For example, although a cold is similar to the flu it is in 
fact much different, and so to know on a more rigorous standard that one has a 
cold one needs to recognize how it differs from the flu. Again, one may have 
actually gotten rid of a cold, yet the symptoms may be lingering, leading one to 
think that one still has a cold. Because of these complications, one may know one 
has a cold on a looser evidential standard, but not really know one has a cold if 
one adopts a more rigorous standard. Nevertheless, loose standards as regards one’s 
state of knowledge may be completely appropriate, such as when one enters the 
office in the morning and is making light conversation. Sniffling and sneezing, one 
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is asked whether the source might be allergies, to which, “I know I have a cold. 
It’s not just allergy, so you’d better keep your distance,” is a perfectly reasonable 
comment, despite one’s ignorance of the differences between a cold and the flu. 
But then if pressed about the difference between a cold and the flu, one might 
confess, “I know I have a cold, but (ok) I don’t really know I have a cold, now that 
you insist on the difference between a cold and the flu.” 
“I don’t know very much that Bush is president” is an unusual sentence, but 
that may be because of the current state of English and not a reflection of the non-
gradability of knowledge claims. More sensible sounding is, “About the claim that 
Bush is president, I don’t know very much.” Still, it is an awkward comment 
because there is not much to know about the claim that Bush is president: either 
he is president or not, and either one knows this or not. But take instead a more 
nuanced claim, such as the one we used above: “About the claim that atoms have 
orbitals, I don’t know very much.” This claim would be true if one’s knowledge 
that atoms have orbitals is simplistic and meets the lowest of standards, such as if 
one just believes this on the basis of one’s faint recollection of a high school 
chemistry book. On the other hand, if one is a chemistry professor, one would 
need to know well that atoms have orbitals. A chemistry professor would very 
much know that atoms have orbitals in that she understands orbital theory, and 
particularly understands the evidential basis to this theory. Indeed, an indicator of 
how well one knows this claim could be one’s ability to defend this claim from 
critique. Similarly, one would very much know that one had a cold if one 
understood its viral nature and thus its insensitivity to antibiotics. One would 
know less well that one had a cold if one thought one could be cured by taking 
antibiotics. 
One may nevertheless resist these arguments on the basis of the 
awkwardness of the resultant expressions. It may seem that I am trying to force 
the English language to comply with the dictates of standards contextualism. Of 
course, all languages, including English, are changeable, and new grammatical, 
stylistic constructions are now the norm with the fluidity and expansion of 
technologically-enhanced means of communication. What were once awkward 
expressions can subsequently become highly acceptable. This has, in fact, already 
happened in epistemology. For example, Bayesians talks about ‘degrees of belief,’ 
where one can strongly believe a claim (i.e., assign it a high probability) or weakly 
believe it (i.e., assign it a low probability). Thus, one would say, “I believe that I 
have a cold with a probability of .9,” which is about as awkward a sentence as one 
would ever find. But that infelicity has not hampered Bayesianism as a viable 
epistemology, and for some it is even a favoured, normative theory of belief. 
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What about the use of ‘know’ in comparative constructions? A comparative 
construction involving the gradable verb ‘like’ that Stanley regards as acceptable 
is, “John likes Bill more than Mary does.” An analogous construction with the verb 
‘know’ does not sound at all acceptable: “John knows that Bush is president better 
than Mary does.”23 Stanley then argues, “if the semantics of ‘know’ did involve 
scales of epistemic strength, then there should be uncontroversial examples of 
non-idiomatic comparison and modifications,”24 and since there are not, 
knowledge ascriptions are not gradable. But just as we can find acceptable 
expressions using modified uses of the verb ‘know,’ so we can find some 
uncontroversial comparative constructions involving ‘know.’ Here’s one: 
“Professor X knows that atoms have orbitals better than her students do.”  Again, 
the example involving Bush sounds odd because knowing that Bush is president is 
an uncomplicated ‘yes/no’ matter. On the other hand, more sophisticated claims 
can be known with more or less intellectual rigour. It sounds reasonable to say 
that Professor X’s knowledge of atomic orbitals is better than her students’ 
knowledge in that she has an awareness of the evidential basis to this claim and 
how this claim fits into the overall explanatory structure of atomic theory. 
Students, by comparison, would simply know this claim by rote. Note that the 
sense in which the professor knows better than atoms have orbitals is not simply 
that she possesses more facts about atomic orbitals. It may be that John knows 
more facts about Bush and about his presidency than Mary does, but still does not 
know better than Mary that Bush is president. The difference with the question of 
Bush’s presidency is that the evidential basis to knowing that Bush is president is 
straightforward and uncomplicated, not requiring the use of sophisticated, 
experimental apparatus. Moreover, possessing this knowledge doesn’t require a lot 
of theoretical complexity: simply, the presidential office is the highest executive 
office in the land, and Bush occupies the post. One knows just as well that Bush is 
president regardless of one’s comprehension of the details of the American 
political system or of how one acquires this knowledge through media sources. To 
take another mundane claim, one knows that something is a car regardless of one’s 
understanding of the internal combustion engine, the makes and models of cars 
built by major automobile companies, and so on. Thus, it sounds awkward to say 
that someone knows better than another that something is a car. By comparison, 
one could know better that one has a cold than another person if one is aware of 
the subtle symptomatic differences between a cold and the flu that allows one to 
distinguish them. So, to summarize what’s been argued in this section, with 
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(standards) contextualism we’d expect the word ‘know’ to be gradable in that one 
can know a claim to a greater or lesser degree. As such, we’d expect linguistic 
expressions of knowledge to allow for modifiers, and be amenable to comparative 
constructions. Although we concede that knowledge expressions of the more 
mundane, unsophisticated sort typically do fail gradability (in not allowing for 
modifiers and not being amenable to comparative constructions), this is not the 
case with more complex assertions of knowledge, such as those found in the 
sciences. With these more complex matters, one can know claims to a greater or 
lesser degree, depending on one’s awareness of the evidential basis to these claims 
and one’s understanding of the explanatory theories that underlie them. As the 
sciences are commonly held to be our prime repository for first-class knowledge 
claims, the gradability of scientific knowledge claims speaks on behalf of standards 
contextualism. 
2.3 Stanley’s Second Linguistic Critique: Unusual Speech-Act Reports and 
Anaphora  
Stanley’s second critique of contextualism involves some sample conversations 
people would have if contextualism were true, conversations Stanley finds to be 
highly problematic. In the first conversation, A and B are looking at a zebra in a 
zoo and A asserts, “I know that is a zebra.” B points out that the animal is 
indistinguishable (for A) from a cleverly painted mule, which A concedes. B then 
second-guesses A’s pronouncement that she knows it is a zebra, to which A 
responds, “I didn’t say I [knew it was a zebra].”25 Stanley finds this speech act 
report to be “very strange” (indeed, “well-nigh incoherent”26), though it sounds 
“perfectly reasonable” to the contextualist.27 In the second example, someone is 
reflecting on whether she knows that she as hands. “If I have hands, then I know I 
have hands,” she says to herself. She then considers the skeptical possibility that 
she is a brain in a vat, and in the midst of seriously considering this possibility 
comes to the conclusion that, even if she has hands, she doesn’t know that she 
does. Nevertheless, she concedes, “what I said earlier is still true,” where ‘what I 
said earlier’ anaphorically connects to “if I have hands, then I know I have hands.” 
Stanley finds such an anaphor “very difficult to grasp,”28 even though a 
contextualist would find it unproblematic. 
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Stanley is frank that these sorts of discourses are perfectly sensible with 
other sorts of contextually sensitive terminology, such as with ‘possibility’29 and 
‘wealth.’30 What is not made clear by him is why the word ‘know’ is ineligible for 
such context-sensitivity. My suspicion is that, whereas the examples Stanley 
provides illustrating the context-sensitivity of ‘possibility’ and ‘wealth’ are familiar 
to everyday speakers, the examples relating to the word ‘know’ describe skeptical 
possibilities that many people find fanciful, if not ludicrous. The possibilities that 
zoos are populated with zebra pens filled with cleverly painted mules (as though 
mules look at all like zebras), or that we might be brains in vats, are not terribly 
serious. No one is going to doubt their knowledge that they’re seeing zebras or 
that they have hands solely on such bases. So to test Stanley’s intuitions about the 
failure of context-sensitivity as regards knowledge claims, we need to find an 
example that does not trade in extraordinary skeptical scenarios. Here is one such 
case. 
As is well known, crocodile and alligators are quite similar. In fact, most 
people do not know how to tell them apart. For those of us who don’t live in areas 
where these animals are endemic, or who are not biologists, the words are likely 
interchangeable: a ‘crocodile’ is a ‘crocodile or alligator.’ Now suppose A and B are 
again at the zoo, this time near the crocodile pool, and A asserts about a crocodile, 
“I know that is a crocodile.” B points out that the animal is indistinguishable (for 
A) from an alligator, which A again concedes. B then second-guesses A’s 
pronouncement that she knows it is a crocodile, to which A responds, “I didn’t say 
I knew it was a crocodile.” Is A’s speech act report ‘very strange’ and ‘well-nigh 
incoherent’? I would say it is perfectly reasonable. In essence, A’s initial 
pronouncement is uttered on the basis of the low standards appropriate to those 
for whom crocodiles are indistinguishable from alligators (but quite 
distinguishable from snakes, frogs and so on). B is then pointing out that A’s 
categorization is too loose, and that because she doesn’t know the difference 
between crocodiles and alligators, she doesn’t really know – using higher, more 
scientific standards – that the animal she is looking at is a crocodile. A’s speech act 
report, then, amounts to the admission that she wasn’t using these higher 
standards in saying that the animal is a crocodile.  
The anaphoric case is dealt with similarly. Suppose someone is reflecting on 
whether she knows that an animal is a crocodile. She thinks, “If that is a crocodile, 
then I know it is a crocodile.” She then considers the non-skeptical possibility that 
the animal is actually an alligator, and in the midst of seriously considering this 
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possibility comes to the conclusion that, even if it is a crocodile, she doesn’t know 
that it is. Nevertheless, she concedes, “what I said earlier is still true,” where ‘what 
I said earlier’ anaphorically connects to “if that is a crocodile, then I know it is a 
crocodile.” Is such an anaphor ‘very difficult to grasp’?  Not at all, once we see her 
earlier pronouncement as uttered in the context of the lower standards people 
sometimes adopt as regards what counts as a crocodile, where on such lower 
standards crocodiles and alligators are essentially the same kind of animals. In 
effect, she recognizes that on a more rigorous standard her claim to know that the 
animal is a crocodile is disputable, but affirms nevertheless that she could still be 
said to know on a common, looser standard. 
So far we have examined, and responded to Stanley’s objections to 
contextualism on the basis of contextualism’s alleged failure to generate the right 
result in Ignorant High Stakes, as well as its tendency to produce awkward 
linguistic constructions. We now look at one further criticism of contextualism, 
specifically, Stanley’s misgivings about the sort of contextualism we are advocating 
here, ‘standards’ contextualism. Stanley’s focus is standards contextualism as 
advanced by Peter Ludlow,31 to which we now turn. 
2.4 Ludlow’s Standards Contextualism  
As Stanley recounts, Ludlow highlights the fact that references to standards are 
common in scientific discourse. To illustrate, Stanley cites the following examples:  
1) John doesn’t know that water is a liquid by the standards of chemistry. 
2) Copernicus didn’t know that the sun was at the centre of the solar 
system by today’s standards of knowledge.32  
Now it’s worth pointing out that these examples are somewhat unclear. 
First, one doesn’t really need to make reference to the standards of chemistry in 
affirming that water is a liquid, as this fact is quite visible. Secondly, someone’s 
knowledge today that the sun is at the centre of the solar system likely makes no 
reference to (scientific) standards – it is simply a logical truth (a ‘solar system’ is a 
‘sun-centred system’). Moreover, Copernicus didn’t believe so much that the sun is 
at the centre of the solar system, rather that it is the centre of the universe, and so 
he lacks knowledge not so much because of our higher standards today but simply 
because of his overall fundamental confusion about the structure of the universe. 
Nevertheless, these critical points need not distract us from the basic 
insight, that in science – for many the best place to look for knowledge – one 
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usually finds references to epistemic standards in knowledge ascriptions. 
Following Ludlow, one might then anticipate that even “unembellished 
knowledge ascriptions, ones that do not contain explicit standards operators, 
nevertheless contain an unpronounced position for epistemic standards.”33 It is 
this suggestion that Stanley finds particularly objectionable. The basis for his 
concern is the observation (which he attributes to David Lewis) that ‘standards 
talk’ occurs in all sorts of discourses, not just in epistemic ones. Here Stanley cites 
the examples of: 
1) By strict standards, France is not hexagonal. 
2) By loose standards, this table is square. 
3) By the standards of chemistry, what is in the Hudson River isn’t 
water.34 
He makes the point that, on the basis of the regularity with which ones 
finds these appended standards statements, one cannot “derive a conclusion about 
specifically epistemic context-sensitivity”35 – and surely right about this, though 
this is not a derivation that Ludlow nor any standards contextualist needs to make. 
Rather, the relevant argument for the standards contextualist is normative: 
standards are regularly cited in scientific discourse, and since such discourse 
constitutes our best form of knowledge, standards should have a place in all forms 
of knowledge ascriptions. Be that as it may, one may follow Stanley’s worry that, 
as motivated by the scientific model, “one would need standards positions in the 
syntax for virtually every predication,”36 whether epistemic or not, a situation he 
describes as “deeply implausible.” Moreover, he thinks the standards contextualist 
is committed to such an implausible conclusion, apparently because he sees the 
standards contextualist as arguing from the general ubiquity of standards discourse 
to its relevance to epistemic discourse – the argument we saw him also wrongly 
ascribing to standards contextualism above. But again this is not an argument a 
standards contextualist need subscribe to. There is no reason why standards 
contextualism should be committed to the claim that any sort of predication 
requires a standards position. 
As Stanley describes the development of contextualism, starting with Fred 
Dretske’s relevant alternatives theory, through to Gail Stine’s contextualist 
improvement of Dretske’s theory, and arriving at the versions of contextualism 
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formulated by Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose,37 one of the main motivations for 
the theory was to explain how one can know that one has hands, but not know 
that one is not a brain in a vat – that is, to explain the failure of deductive closure 
for knowledge. With standards contextualism, the explanation is essentially that 
the premise (“I know that I have hands”) is understood to involve low standards 
for knowledge, whereas the conclusion (“I don’t know that I am not a brain in a 
vat”) involves high standards. Stanley submits that this contextualist interpretation 
of the case leaves its “oddity … unexplained.”38 But that is true only if one is 
committed to the failure of deductive closure in this case, and there is no reason 
why the contextualist should be so committed. There are in fact epistemologies 
that do require the failure of closure here, such as epistemologies that are 
committed to a sensitivity condition (i.e., one knows that p only if, were p not 
true, one would not believe p). But there is no necessity that contextualism be one 
of these epistemologies. Rather, a contextualist might suggest that the same low 
standards be used with both the premise and the conclusion, with the result that 
closure is preserved. So a contextualist can do better than explain the oddity – she 
can remove it. 
This completes our responses on behalf of standards contextualism to the 
critiques offered in Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests. In their 
Knowledge in an Uncertain World, the practicalists Fantl and McGrath also raise 
objections to contextualism. We examine their arguments next. 
3. Fantl and McGrath versus Contextualism  
For Fantl and McGrath, it is fallibilism about knowledge – the thesis that one can 
know that p even though (one is aware that) there is a chance that p is false – that 
orients their discussion of the comparative merits of contextualism and 
practicalism. Once one gets over the puzzling nature of fallibilism, which Fantl 
and McGrath describe as the ‘madness’ of fallibilism,39 one is left with the more 
practical question of determining how likely it must be that p is false for one’s 
claim to knowledge to be withdrawn. In this regard they quote Laurence Bonjour, 
who comments that “it is … unclear what sort of basis or rationale there might be 
for fixing [this likelihood] in a non-arbitrary way.”40 Their answer to the problem 
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of what could constitute such a ‘basis or rationale’ is to point to what is practically 
at stake: p is probable enough to be known if it is “probable enough to be properly 
put to work as a basis for belief and action.”41 Fantl and McGrath don’t say a great 
deal about what it means for a proposition to be ‘properly put to work as a basis 
for belief and action,’ but here is a familiar case that perhaps captures what they 
have in mind. The case, drawn from Rudner’s 1953 paper “The Scientist qua 
Scientist Makes Value Judgments,” concerns a scientist who, given a set of 
evidence, is considering the safety of a drug, and Rudner’s claim is that the degree 
of confirmation of the hypothesis, ‘this drug is safe,’ is a function both of the 
(conditional) probability of this hypothesis given the evidence and “the 
importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or 
rejecting the hypothesis.”42  As such, ‘this drug is safe’ is probable enough to be 
accepted for Rudner if the potential for harm from using the drug is low enough to 
be ethically acceptable, and this is arguably what Fantl and McGrath mean when 
they say that a proposition is “probable enough to be properly put to work as a 
basis for belief and action.” 
But there is a different way to answer Bonjour’s challenge and find an 
alternative, non-arbitrary criterion that tells us when the probability of a 
proposition is high enough for this proposition to be the subject of knowledge. 
Fantl and McGrath assert that there is, at least, a probability that is low enough to 
categorically rule out a claim to knowledge: “presumably,” they say, “there can’t 
be knowledge with probability 0, probability 1/2, or even probability 2/3.”43 And 
to be sure, a probability of 1 would be high enough to ground a claim to 
knowledge. Given that we are stuck with fallibilism, is there then a probability 
less than 1 that can assuredly meet the challenge of knowledge? My suspicion is 
that reference to probabilities in an assessment of the evidential support for a 
hypothesis is unnecessary. Consider, for example, a piece of mundane perceptual 
knowledge, such as when someone knows that she sees a hand.  In such a case, 
does a knower need to be aware of the probability of the truth of her belief given 
the available evidence? Typically, when someone knows that she has a hand, she 
will have no precise idea at all of how probable the truth of her belief is, short of 
its being ‘high enough.’ Rather, she will ground her knowledge on a variety of 
factors, such as the coherence of her belief with other beliefs she has, the evidence 
that her perceptual system is functioning properly (e.g., that she is not subject to 
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hallucinations, that her eyes are not diseased, and so on), and other matters whose 
impact on the justification of her belief is substantive, but cannot be usefully 
quantified. Once those factors have been settled upon and it is determined that 
they justify a belief, a knower may suggest that her belief has a strong likelihood 
of being true, without giving this likelihood a precise quantitative value. That is, 
probability assignments used in the justification of a claim are really just 
afterthoughts: they are ways of summarizing the quality of non-quantitative 
evidence. I think this is what we find in scientific contexts as well, with the 
exception being cases where statistical analysis is the core methodology. 
What this means, then, is that Bonjour’s challenge misconstrues the process 
of justification. Justifying a claim is not a matter of continually attempting to 
bump up the probability one attaches to this claim until a ‘threshold’ is reached. 
Such quantitative precision is usually not meaningfully attainable. And so the 
process of ascribing to oneself knowledge should not be viewed as a matter of 
deciding that one’s belief is, in the first instance, ‘probable enough’ and on that 
basis justified. Typically the process is reversed: one ascribes to oneself knowledge 
and then asserts that one’s belief has a high probability of being true (e.g., “I know 
that p, so it’s probably true that p”). It follows that Fantl and McGrath themselves 
misconstrue the challenge facing the intellectualist, or as they call her, the ‘purist.’ 
They comment:  
the fallibilist who recoils at the thought of denying purism or allowing pragmatic 
encroachment should bear in mind her tasks: to explain away the apparent 
madness of fallibilism and to give us some idea of what it takes for a probability 
to be ‘knowledge-level.’ To retain purism (and deny pragmatic encroachment) 
she must perform these tasks without appealing to a conception of significant 
chances of error that allows stakes to play a role – that allows significance to vary 
without corresponding variance in your strength of epistemic position with 
respect to p.44 
Fantl and McGrath are here contending that the purist, to cope with 
fallibilism, will need to find a probability level at which she can be said to know a 
proposition, and explain why this probability level has such an effect without 
making reference to practical matters. Moreover, since the strength of epistemic 
position is assumed to be fixed, she will not be able to explain the ability of this 
probability level to generate knowledge by pointing to a greater preponderance of 
evidence. This is a challenge that Fantl and McGrath do not think the purist can 
meet. 
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But there is a conception of ‘significant chances of error’ that allows this 
significance to vary, without a corresponding variance in how much evidence the 
agent possesses. This is by means of a change in the epistemic standards that 
govern knowledge ascriptions. We should point out initially that by an ‘epistemic 
standard’ we do not mean that, in order to know a proposition, the probability 
that this proposition is true must reach a certain level. Again, epistemic standards 
primarily involve other matters than the probability that a proposition is true, 
since an agent typically lacks a well-grounded idea of the probability of a 
proposition (a key exception, again, are those sciences that make essential use of 
statistical methodologies). Rather, standards involve matters such as those 
mentioned above – e.g., the overall coherence of one’s belief system and the well-
functioning of one’s perceptual apparatus – and a variety of other considerations 
that in many cases are unique to the subject matter. For instance, in the bank cases 
where the proposition of concern is “the bank will be open tomorrow (Saturday),” 
a fairly modest standard on the basis of which the agent could generate convincing 
evidence that the bank would be open tomorrow is whether the agent noticed that 
the bank was open the previous Saturday. By comparison, a more rigorous 
standard would require something like access to official bank policy detailing 
precise opening hours. Generally speaking, the modest standard works fine for 
normal day-to-day contexts, both where the practical stakes are low, but also 
where the practical stakes are not at all relevant. That is, where someone has no 
stake in the matter whether the bank is open (not just a low stake) the lower 
standard is perfectly acceptable in grounding a claim to knowledge. On the other 
hand, if the agent is a bank employee and she were asked whether the bank is 
open tomorrow, she would then be subject to a higher standard by virtue of her 
role. As such, it would be entirely unacceptable for her to make reference simply 
to the fact that the bank was open the previous Saturday in justifying the claim 
that the bank will be open tomorrow. Rather, she would need to make explicit 
reference to bank policy. Note that this need for a higher standard is not a result of 
the agent having higher stakes. There may in fact be nothing practically at stake 
for her in not using the higher standard, such as the threat of job loss. It’s just that, 
as a bank employee, she should know better. 
Ludlow’s introduction of the notion of standards into a contextualist 
epistemology was motivated by scientific examples, and it is these examples that 
work best in illustrating how standards contextualism succeeds at answering the 
problem Fantl and McGrath pose for purism. Suppose we are asked, “Do we know 
that this table is brown?” Using the lower standards usual for quotidian life, one 
would look at the table under acceptable lighting, making sure one was not 
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examining only a covering for the table, and upon seeing a brown colour 
confidently ascribe to oneself knowledge that the table is brown. But of course 
fallibilism is true and one may be mistaken. For example, one may be subject to 
perceptual illusions where it can appear that a table is brown, though in fact it is 
not. The question Fantl and McGrath raise is, “When is the chance of error 
significant enough for one to retract one’s (self-)ascription of knowledge?”, to 
which they answer, “When the practical downside of being mistaken is high 
enough.” The problem they pose for purism, then, is to provide an account of a 
‘significant chance of error’ that does not refer to practical matters (while keeping 
the strength of one’s epistemic position fixed), and here our answer is to suggest 
that in scientific contexts the standard for a table being brown is more rigorous 
than what we find in day-to-day contexts. In fact, strictly speaking, appearing to 
be brown is not good enough for a scientist to conclude that a table is brown since 
the appearance of brown is a product of one’s psychology and not necessarily, 
truly representative of the colours of physical objects. Indeed, for a scientist, tables 
may not be brown nor any other colour for that matter (qua conglomerates of 
colourless atoms and molecules). So with a scientific standard, the claim to know 
that a table is brown is attended with a significant chance of error, and this 
conclusion is arrived at independently of any reference to practical stakes, and 
without having varied the strength of one’s epistemic position (i.e., one perceptual 
evidence for the brownness of the table remains the same). 
The situation in the bank cases is one where the agent knows that the bank 
will be open on Saturday when the stakes are low, but she lacks that knowledge 
when the stakes are high. It is assumed by most, contextualists and practicalists 
alike, that this is intuitively the correct interpretation of the situation. However, 
there is a sense in which this situation is somewhat problematic epistemically 
speaking, given that the strength of the agent’s evidential position does not change 
in moving between the high and low stakes cases, given that she still believes the 
claim either way, and given that the truth value of the claim has not changed 
either. The general contextualist strategy is to suggest that the meaning of ‘knows’ 
varies in the two situations, and that it is this change of meaning that accounts for 
the differing epistemic assessments in the two cases. Yet as Stanley suggests,45 and 
as echoed by Fantl and McGrath,46 such a semantic strategy seems a bit too easy. 
Apart from the fact that changing the meaning of ‘knows’ can account for our 
intuitions in the bank cases, Stanley argues that “there is no further evidence that 
knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive in a distinctively epistemological 
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way.”47 Similarly, Fantl and McGrath assert that in order for contextualism “to be 
plausible we need some independent evidence that the content of knowledge 
attributions can vary with speech context in ordinary non-philosophical 
contexts.”48 For them, as for Stanley, the capacity of contextualism simply to offer 
an interpretation of the bank cases is not enough to render contextualism 
convincing. 
It is here that the reference to epistemic standards can make an important 
difference. It is sometimes claimed that scientific knowledge is the best form of 
knowledge one can obtain. The reason for this acclaim is the rigour with which 
scientists test their hypotheses. When a scientist tests a hypothesis using empirical 
evidence, strict standards are in place to ensure the accuracy of the empirical 
evidence as well as the cogency of the inductive step one takes from the evidence 
to the hypothesis under test. Thus, when a standards contextualist makes the point 
that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive in that they are relative to the 
standards in place in a particular context, there is in fact evidence that such 
ascriptions are context-sensitive in this distinctively epistemological way, 
evidence drawn from an observation of how knowledge claims are made in the 
sciences. Moreover, for the same reason, we thereby have independent evidence 
that the content of knowledge attributions do vary with speech context in 
ordinary non-philosophical contexts, specifically, when one moves from an 
everyday speech context to a scientific speech context where, as a norm of 
scientific discourse, one makes reference to higher epistemic standards in 
defending knowledge claims. 
Having then responded to both Stanley’s and Fantl and McGrath’s 
objections to contextualism, let us conclude by examining two further, potential 
problems for, specifically, standards contextualism.  
4. Two Problems for Standard Contextualism  
To begin with, although the standards themselves make no reference to practical 
issues, one might argue that one’s choice of standards is guided by practical 
matters, so there is no evading practicalism, after all. And in fact there is no doubt 
that practical issues can impel one to raise epistemic standards, such as in the 
Rudner case. However, one’s motivation to choose an epistemic standard need not 
make any reference to practical issues but only to the requirement that a 
knowledge claim have an increased chance of being true. For example, this is the 
motivation of a scientist who adopts a rigorous standard leading to the conclusion 
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that a table isn’t brown (or any colour for that matter). It’s simply that, if we take 
into consideration atomic physics and the psychology of perception, it becomes 
apparent that the colours of objects are more a product or our minds than of what 
properties an object really has. The question of whether that fact has some sort of 
practical benefit is simply irrelevant. The same can be said for a bank employee 
who is asked whether her bank is open on Saturday. Here she uses the higher 
standard of referencing company policy, not because there is some practical 
benefit in doing, but only because this is the better, official way of finding out the 
truth as regards a bank’s opening hours. Of course, the bank employee and the 
scientist could adopt a practical motivation, if they wish, for the conclusions they 
derive. They simply don’t need to, and moreover it wouldn’t sound right for either 
of them to cite practical benefits in justifying the standards they adopt. The 
scientist who says that she refers to atomic theory and the psychology of 
perception in answering questions about the colour of physical objects because she 
can make a profit by doing so should probably be distrusted on scientific issues. 
One should also be skeptical about the bank employee who cites company policy 
because it gives her a feeling of power. What would she say if that feeling of 
power led her in a different direction? 
The second concern with standards contextualism is how one should justify 
the use of a lower epistemic standard, if a higher standard is available. Shouldn’t 
one always defer to a higher epistemic standard in assessing knowledge 
ascriptions, if one’s objective is unremittingly epistemic? It is important that the 
gravity of this problem for standards contextualism not be underestimated, for one 
aspect of contextualism is an element of equality in the various meanings that can 
be attached to the word ‘know.’ This equality stems from the fact that, from a 
contextualist perspective, many epistemic issues boil down to semantics. For 
example, in the philosophy classroom, one often uses the word ‘know’ in a strict 
way that leads to skepticism, on the assumption that there could be such things as 
brains in vats or Evil Demons. On the other hand, outside the classroom, the 
meaning of ‘know’ is more liberal and one need not guard against such extreme 
skeptical possibilities. It follows that, if the choice of the meaning of ‘know’ is 
guided primarily by epistemic concerns, one should likely use the higher 
(skeptical) standard found in philosophy classrooms. This problem has an analog 
when we turn to the epistemic standards used in everyday life as compared to 
those adopted in scientific practice. If a rigorous scientific perspective informs us 
that physical objects are not really coloured, and that colours are simply 
psychological constructs, then epistemically speaking everyone should believe that 
objects aren’t coloured since that’s the result of adopting the highest epistemic 
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standard. Of course, this is an unintuitive result since we do believe, and think we 
know, that objects are coloured (that, for example, a table is brown) in the normal 
course of daily affairs, despite the fact that this knowledge is grounded in the use 
of a lower epistemic standard. 
In this regard, it’s worthwhile pointing out that this problem does not arise 
if we are practicalists. Where there is not much is at stake in a knowledge 
ascription, a practicalist will condone the use of a lower epistemic standard. For 
example, whether the brownness of a table really inheres in a table or is simply a 
psychic construct, or whether I am a brain in a vat or a real human being, makes 
no practical difference if one is using the table for day-to-day uses. Thus, the 
practicalist has no trouble claiming to know that “this table is (really) brown” and 
“I am not a brain in a vat.” Here we have an illustration of why Fantl and McGrath 
think practicalism to be so “attractive and easy,” to be so “extremely plausible.”49 
For them, the plausibility of practicalism “doesn’t depend on the particular 
epistemic standards in force in the speech context” but is instead a result of a 
principle they call ‘Action,’ that “if you know something which is relevant to your 
choice situation then you are proper to act on it.”50 Clearly, in normal contexts, it 
is proper for one to act on “this table is (really) brown” and “I am not a brain in a 
vat.” 
So, with standards contextualism, how do we justify the use of a lower 
epistemic standard, if a higher standard is available? The answer to this difficulty 
is to look more closely at how one goes about testing a hypothesis and, on the 
basis of these tests, judging that one is in a position to know the hypothesis. These 
tests will inevitably involve evidential reports regarding mundane observable 
objects whose existence and properties are largely taken for granted. That is, in 
assessing the reality of these mundane objects, a lower epistemic standard is taken 
and must be taken if the process of evaluating a hypothesis on the basis of a higher 
standard is to ever get started. One finds, paradoxically, such a preference 
occurring in the philosophy classroom, where philosophers debate the reality of 
mundane objects while feeling no awkwardness about taking the chairs they are 
sitting on and the pens they are using for granted. We also find this preference for 
lower standards in the psychology lab where the colours of objects are considered 
figmentary psychic constructs, but where researchers still calmly point out to each 
other apparently real colours of tables and chairs. In general terms, for an 
epistemic inquiry to proceed, one needs to work from a base of accepted claims, 
such as background assumptions and observational claims, whose evidential 
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support is held to a lower standard. This lower standard is needed so that the 
inquiry can gain deliberative traction: the philosophical discussion of skepticism 
needs to make commonplace assumptions about the world in order for the 
discussants to even communicate, and in the psychology lab if the researchers 
can’t assume the intersubjective reality of the coloured, observed world, there 
would be no way for them to even discuss the psychic construction of the world. 
Thus even if we assume with contextualism that there is a preference for the use 
of higher standards regarding the use of the word ‘know,’ the practice of epistemic 
evaluation requires, nevertheless, a lower standard for the framing of evidential 
claims. 
But one needs knowledge claims meeting lower standards not just for 
evidential assessments. Most knowledge claims are based on a background of other 
knowledge claims which must be accepted before the initial knowledge claim can 
itself be accepted. As an illustration, consider again the High Stakes bank case 
where there is much at risk for the agent if she fails to deposit her cheque on time. 
It is suggested that the agent doesn’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday 
given the seriousness of missing a bill payment. Alternatively, the 
recommendation is that the agent should wait in the Friday line-up to deposit her 
cheque. But that recommendation holds only if there are other claims that we 
assume the agent knows in this case, claims that are relevant to her projected 
courses of action. For example, she may be mistaken about whether she’s at the 
right bank, and so waiting in the Friday line-up could have disastrous results for 
her. Thus, the agent’s reasoning, that she doesn’t know that the bank will be open 
on Saturday and that she must go to the bank on Friday afternoon, relies on a 
previous knowledge claim that she knows this is the right bank. Now, the problem 
for the practicalist is this: given a high stakes, practical situation, it may be 
unreasonable to ascribe to the agent knowledge that she is at the right bank. In 
fact, given a high stakes, practical situation, it may be that the agent hardly knows 
anything at all relevant to the situation. So when arriving at the bank on Friday 
and seeing the long line-ups, what should the agent do? The analysis has now 
become highly complicated for the practicalist. With high enough stakes, the 
practicalist is soon driven to a practical and deliberative paralysis. 
It is at this stage that standards contextualism shows its worth. As we have 
suggested, even where one has set high epistemic standards, the application of 
these standards requires the use of lower standards for knowledge claims that 
underpin the use of the higher standards. So lower standards will need to apply if 
we are to even get to use higher standards. But none of this makes sense for the 
practicalist: if practical circumstances compel one to retract one’s knowledge 
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claims, even where the evidential support appears strong, then they will compel 
one to retract one’s knowledge claims wherever they impact one’s decision 
making. They do this because they force the agent to raise her epistemic standards 
both for knowledge claims under contention and for any relevant background 
knowledge claims: again, this is because the failure of any of these knowledge 
claims could have serious practical consequences. On the other hand, the 
procedure for the standards contextualist is to look to the standards themselves as 
a guide to whether one has knowledge. For any number of background claims and 
for a variety of evidential claims, one will adopt reduced standards simply as a way 
to move an investigation along. Now, even when a serious practical situation 
arises, these reduced standards will still apply, though the standard for the claim 
under contention may be heightened.  This is because such claims will have wide 
application in a variety of areas of inquiry and decision making, and suspending 
them may be broadly disruptive. Nevertheless, there could be practical pressure to 
raise the standards for these claims and retract the presumption that one knows 
them to be true. At this stage, potential knowers will become conflicted: one 
knows these claims on a lower standard but doesn’t know them on a higher 
standard. One finds this situation occurring in the philosophy classroom where 
skepticism is the topic of discussion and where, if we lack knowledge on anything 
at all, we lack knowledge that we’re sitting in a philosophy classroom discussing 
skepticism. This conflict is resolved, as we all know, by abandoning the higher 
standard and allowing a lower standard. We do this to avert a practical and 
deliberative paralysis. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper my goal has been to defend standards contextualism from criticisms 
posed against it by Jason Stanley, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. Let me 
emphasize that in discussing epistemic standards, not just any standards will do. 
There are strict rules over what count as good epistemic standards, rules drawn 
from the quotidian norms on knowing and the heightened rules one finds in 
academia, science, professional fields and the like. I have not said much at all 
about what these particular standards are and how they are legitimated, only that 
they are directly relevant to the ascription of knowledge claims, and that practical 
matters have no bearing whatsoever on their legitimization. It has also been my 
contention that standards are not specifically designed to demand an increased 
probability for a claim to be warranted. Their use is usually much more qualitative 
than this. As such, the desire expressed by Bonjour and others to find a level of 
probability sufficient for knowledge is misconceived and even distracting. Finally, 
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we have with standards contextualism a reasonable and efficient analysis of the 
nature and legitimacy of skepticism: basically, skeptics are in the business of 
raising the standards on knowledge, an honorable and often worthwhile activity. 
Our response to skepticism is that, if we are not careful, standards will be raised to 
a point where epistemic investigation becomes impossible, and that situation is 
surely of not much practical benefit. Moreover, though it is good thing to know 
claims, one can often get along just fine (practically speaking) having only 
justified, true beliefs, or just true beliefs, or even just beliefs. For example, the 
agent in High Stakes may decide to wait in the Friday line-up after considering 
the risks of being wrong and wishing to be sure about her knowledge. But it may 
turn out that in doing this she is acting in an extremely impractical manner 
compared to a less cautious person who, despite her lack of knowledge, puts off 
the visit till the next day and finds the bank open with no line-ups. 
 
 
